日航 123便
墜落の真相を明らかにする会
Nakasone and JL123
Christopher P. Hood
I have been researching about JL123 since 2007. When I began my research, I never thought that it would become necessary to research the cause of the crash. As far as I was concerned, the cause was known. The English language documentaries that I had seen, the few book English-language books that discussed the cause, and the English-language internet sites that discuss the crash left me in no doubt that the cause of the crash had firmly been established many years ago. But then I began to watch Japanese language documentaries, read Japanese books, and look at Japanese language websites, and I realised that there were many questions that needed to be answered.
My background is in Japanese Studies, and I like to combine a range of approaches such as anthropology, historical perspectives, semiotics, and political studies. What I’m not is an aeronautical engineer or a specialist in aviation accidents. Despite having an interest in these areas going back many years, my knowledge is based on reading books and watching documentaries rather than specialist studies. However, throughout my studies of the JL123 crash I believe that I have been able to use my expertise to consider the facts available in considering the validity of the official crash report and other materials.
I had an interest in the JL123 crash due to it being the first time I remember hearing Japan in the news, but I never imagined researching the crash in any way myself. But having made a friend whose father was on the flight and then having a friend at JAL who looked after the family of the sole British victim on the flight, Kimble Mathews, and meeting Kimble’s father, Peter, I felt that there were things that I could research. That Peter Mathews had kept a diary and taken photographs while in Fujioka in 1985 further supported my desire to do the research, and left me with a feeling that I should do it.
As well as being surprised about the level of concerns about the real cause of the crash when I started using Japanese materials, I also remember my reaction when I reading a sentence in one book that commented on who the prime minister at the time was; Yasuhiro Nakasone. My reaction was ‘again?’. Nakasone had been one of the main focusses of my PhD and first academic books. He also featured in my second academic book about the shinkansen. I could never have imagined that he would become a part of my next study too. Having spent many years trying to ‘get inside his head’ through reading his works and also interviewing him a few times, I hoped that my knowledge of him would help in looking at a variety of issues relating to JL123.
Having read around 100 books to date, I am still not convinced that rapid depressurisation took place in JL123 as is set out in the official report and is put forward as the probable cause. Naturally, if one comes to that conclusion, the next logical question to ask is ‘What was the cause then?’ In considering the answer to this, I have looked at a range of evidence, but also taken into account what is missing.
Let me start with Nakasone himself. Here was a Prime Minister who tried to change the nature of Japanese politics and political leadership. He was a much more presidential style of leader, making top-down decisions rather than merely rubber-stamping decisions that had been passed up through the system. Coming at a time when the world saw many similar such leaders, for example, Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, François Mitterrand, and Helmet Kohl, his style felt familiar to me when I studied him. But, when it comes to JL123, I am struck by things he said or did, or rather he did not say or do, and I struggle to come to terms with this. JL123 crashed in Gunma, Nakasone’s home prefecture. Yet, he did not go to the crash site itself until November, by which time it had been largely cleaned up. He did not go to see any of the bereaved families in Fujioka, or even the survivors. The impression was that he did not want to be involved with the crash at all, with his focus seemingly being much more on his visit to Yasukuni Shrine on 15 August (three days after the JL123 crash). This behaviour is in stark comparison to that of UK Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, who cut short a holiday in Australia to return to the UK and visit the scene of an aircraft accident at Manchester Airport (which occurred on 22nd August, the week after the JL123 crash), where she made it clear that her government would ensure that the cause would be uncovered and that there would be no repeat of the accident. Why didn’t Nakasone do anything like this?
Having studied Nakasone for so many years, it is tempting to say that the only reason why he didn’t want to be distracted by JL123 was due to the upcoming 40th anniversary of the end of the war and his visit to Yasukuni Shrine. But there is other evidence which means that I find it impossible to reach this conclusion without any reservations.
When I consider what has been written about Nakasone and JL123, I cannot ignore those which suggest that he was involved in some way with the plane being shot down. On the face of it, I find such suggestions, particularly the idea that it was done deliberately, hard to pallet. After all, there would have been no doubt, had the plan gone exactly as desired, that the incident would have over-shadowed his visit to Yasukuni Shrine. This seems incomprehensible to me, based on my knowledge and understanding of Nakasone. And yet, when I look at other evidence, I cannot ignore the very real possibility that the SDF were somehow involved with what happened to JL123.
During the course of my research I met Ryōichi Ogawa and looked at the photographs that his father took on board JL123. As I discuss in my book Dealing with Disaster in Japan: Reponses to the Flight JL123 Crash, when taking into consideration all of the photographs taken, it seems highly probable that Mr Ogawa stood up from his seat, despite the seat belt sign being on, and attempted to take photographs of something outside of the plane. That he took the photographs, rather than his daughter who had been sat by the window (as we know from another picture taken in the plane), suggests that the focus of attention was not Mount Fuji, as it would first appear from the photographs, but something else. By chance, looking at the first of the pictures that he took, and zooming in on a digital version of it, one can see that there is an object in the photograph. The object appears to be orange – the colour of a missile that the SDF possessed.
Was JL123 hit by a missile? I find it hard to believe. After all, there is no mention of a missile in any of the isho – some of which were written by people close to where Mr Ogawa was sat and one has to assume that there would have been people in that part of the plane discussing seeing the missile. But given how many in one area of the plane wrote isho, is it not possible that many more wrote isho, but that these were not recovered as they had been destroyed by authorities not wanting their contents to become known? Did a similar ‘cleaning up’ process happen at the crash site? Does this explain why it took so long for the crash site to be confirmed, with nearly 20 sites being suggested as the crash site during an almost 12-hour period from the crash? There was still a five-hour period between when the crash site was confirmed and when the SDF reach the site (by which time the first media reporters had got there). Why the delay? Why was nobody winched down from a helicopter? It is said that during the night, this could not have been done due to concerns about the position of electricity wires. Surely a record is kept of where these are, and a phone call could have been made to check that the area was clear. By dawn the next morning, that there are no electricity pylons and wires in the area would have been evident, yet, still, no helicopters were dispatched to the scene. Why?
I find it hard to understand that darkness and remoteness of Osutaka-no-One and Ueno-mura were the cause of the horrendous delays during the night. I accept that the situation was unprecedented and difficult. But, surely these are the conditions when an organisation like the SDF should be able to respond. How could they defend Japan from an invading force if they could not cope with an incident like JL123?
So, did something else happen at the crash site during the night? I find this hard to believe. Partly as I would prefer not to believe it, I suppose. But, also because ‘cleaning up’ the site over that night to get rid of any evidence of SDF involvement in the loss of JL123 would have been so difficult. Torches and other lighting would have been needed – but nothing of this sort was reported by the media helicopters. Similarly, the survivors do not speak of hearing voices, other than those of other passengers, during the night. Rather than ‘clean up’, did the SDF try to make the site devoid of evidence of wrongdoing by causing further destruction to the site?
Then, other evidence could have been dealt with as time went on. Although the report says that there is no evidence of parts of JL123 being hit by external forces, if we are to work on the basis that the authorities were involved in a cover-up, how can we trust this evidence? When I look at the wreckage of JL123 at the JAL Safety Promotion Center, I find it hard to believe that these are parts from the same plane; the rear bulkhead, in particular, doesn’t look the same as the one photographed at the site, and rapidly removed from view. On top of this, other key evidence is likely to remain in Sagami Bay, where the underwater search may not have been done to a satisfactory level or have covered a wide enough area.
I first met Aoyama-san in January 2019 after we had got in contact with each other the previous Autumn following the publication of one of her books for which she had also used my research as a resource. We then met up again in April that year when she visited Cardiff, together with Susanne Bayly-Yukawa, to speak to give a special seminar to my students. Before the seminar, the three of us also discussed the crash in detail, as Aoyama-san has discussed in another of her books. Now, in this book, Aoyama-san has found and discussed the evidence that points to what happened to JL123 being more than a crash, but an incident involving an SDF missile.
In the end, my thoughts keep coming back to the words of one of those who had a chance to see the evidence at the crash site. He said that what happened to JL123 was ‘murder’. What did he mean? Whatever the answer, one thing is certain, there is still much to be understood about what happened to JL123 and what the involvement of the government was in both the cause and any possible cover-up.
**********
Dr Christopher Hood was an academic and author based at Cardiff University. His research interests primarily relate to Japan and fall into two areas. First, he is particularly interested in themes relating to identity and symbolism. Second, he is interested in issues relating to the railways and aviation in Japan. In 2016 he received a Certificate of Commendation from the Ambassador of Japan in the UK in recognition of distinguished service to contributing to the deepening of mutual understanding and friendship between Japan and UK. He is currently the President of the British Association for Japanese Studies (www.bajs.org.uk). He is the author of five academic books; Education Reform in Japan: Nakasone’s Legacy, Shinkansen: From Bullet Train to Symbol of Modern Japan, Dealing With Disaster in Japan: Responses to the Flight JL123 Crash, Osutaka: A Chronicle of Loss in the World’s Largest Single Plane Crash, and Japan: The Basics. He has edited two other titles; Doing Business with the Japanese (co-editor with Prof G. Bownas and D. Powers) and the 4 volume The Politics of Modern Japan. He has also written two novels, Hijacking Japan and Tokyo 20/20 Vision.
Twitter: @HoodCP